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TREADING WATER: HOW CITIZENS, STATES, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY CAN RESTORE PROPER CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S 









Upon the passage of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) in 1972, primary 
responsibility for protecting the United States' water quality and 
preventing water pollution shifted from the states to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”). The program at the heart of the Clean Water 
Act, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), 
requires anyone who discharges pollutants into the waters of the United 
States to abide by the terms of a permit issued under the program. If a 
discharge occurs in violation of the permit or without a permit, and 
prosecutors are able to prove the responsible party acted with ordinary 
negligence, criminal charges can be brought under the statute. Forty-
 
* Marley Kimelman is a third-year law student at The George Washington University 
Law School, class of 2021, focused on environmental enforcement and protection. 
Marley graduated from Northeastern University in 2017 with a B.S. in Environmental 
Studies and International Affairs and a minor in Global Social Entrepreneurship. 
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seven states have been authorized by the EPA to run and enforce an 
NPDES permit program within their own borders. Instead of adopting an 
intent standard of ordinary negligence as the federal statute and 
regulations require, many states have been authorized to run their 
programs with “gross” or “criminal” negligence intent standards. 
Litigation over Idaho’s recent program approval could force the EPA to 
assume responsibility over all approved state programs that are out of 
compliance with the CWA and the EPA’s regulations. This outcome 
could overload the EPA and put the NPDES program in jeopardy of 
complete failure. But, with a few regulatory changes, the EPA can 
prevent further litigation, comply with its non-discretionary duties laid 
out in the CWA, and ensure the proper level of criminal deterrence 




It was just past midnight on March 24, 1989. The captain of the 
Exxon Valdez, Joseph Hazelwood, had been drinking and was away from 
his controls. His ship propelled along the jagged coast of Alaska.1 The 
pitch-black waves of the Prince William Sound pounded relentlessly on 
the sides of the massive oil tanker. That morning, the Exxon Valdez, 
carrying over fifty-three million gallons of crude oil, collided with Bligh 
Reef about 1.5 miles off the coast of Tatitlek, Alaska, spilling its 
contents into the Sound.2 Before the flow could be stopped, over ten 
million gallons of crude oil contaminated one of the most ecologically 
sensitive and remote locations in the United States.3 Countless mammals, 
birds, and fish were killed or harmed, and thousands of people’s 
livelihoods were destroyed.4 
In 1997, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld misdemeanor charges 
against Cpt. Hazelwood under Alaska state law.5 The eight-year criminal 
court battle and Cpt. Hazelwood’s eventual conviction on criminal 
charges turned on the court’s interpretation of a single word in the 
statute: negligence.6 The question before the court was whether Cpt. 
Hazelwood could be charged criminally for mere ordinary negligence,7 
 
1 See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, HISTORY (Aug.  21, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/exxon-valdez-oil-spill. 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.790; State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 885 (Alaska 
1997).  
6 See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 885.  
7 Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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or was a form of heightened or “gross” negligence8 needed?9 Ultimately, 
the Alaska Supreme court held that ordinary negligence was enough for 
criminal charges.10 
The criminal case against Cpt. Hazelwood was decided in State v. 
Hazelwood.11 Cpt. Hazelwood was not prosecuted under the Clean Water 
Act (CWA).12 Rather, it was the ordinary “negligence” intent standard, or 
mens rea, in the Alaskan statute that gave the state prosecutors the ability 
to bring criminal charges.13 Without this ordinary negligence mens rea,14 
Cpt. Hazelwood’s actions would not have resulted in any type of 
criminal penalty under the state statute. This same mens rea is found in 
the CWA, giving federal prosecutors the ability to bring misdemeanor 
criminal charges against negligent violators of the CWA.15 While state 
prosecutors should have this same ability to prosecute criminally under 
an ordinary negligence standard,16 many states have intentionally 
stripped themselves of this power with the consent of the EPA, 
undermining their ability to properly enforce criminal violations of the 
CWA.  
Because state environmental agencies and the EPA have differing 
capacities, resources, and expertise, the CWA is designed to utilize both 
in its effort to control water pollution. One of the most important aspects 
of the CWA, and a clear example of cooperative federalism, is the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”).17 The 
NPDES program requires dischargers of pollutants into jurisdictional 
waters to obtain and comply with an NPDES permit outlining their 
 
8 Gross Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
9 See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 885. 
10 See id.  
11 See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, supra note 1. 
12 See State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 885 (Alaska 1997). 
13 See id. 
14 See Mens Rea, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea 
(last visited Dec. 7, 2020). Mens rea refers to the state of mind statutorily required in 
order to convict a particular defendant of a particular crime. Establishing the mens rea of 
an offender is usually necessary to prove guilt in a criminal trial. 
15 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 
(2019).  
16 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (“The burden of proof and degree of knowledge or intent 
required under State law for establishing violations under paragraph (a)(3) of this section 
shall be no greater than the burden of proof or degree of knowledge or intent EPA must 
provide when it brings an action under the appropriate Act.”). 
17 See Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1225 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (hailing the NPDES program as the centerpiece of the Clean Water Act). 
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respective pollution allowances before discharging.18 Violators can be 
punished with civil penalties, criminal penalties, or both.19  
In order to preserve the cooperative federalism goal, the CWA 
allows a state to assume its respective NPDES program from the EPA, 
including enforcement power.20 This transfer is not automatic though, 
and is governed by regulations to ensure that states properly and 
effectively maintain the same standards as the EPA.21 The EPA’s 
regulations require that state criminal intent standards, or mens rea, be no 
stricter than the federal standard.22 As previously mentioned, the CWA 
contains an ordinary negligence criminal intent standard.23 A “stricter” 
mens rea standard would require more egregious actions on the part of 
the defendant in order to be charged and convicted under the applicable 
statute.24  
If a state would like to assume its own NPDES program, it must 
submit an application to the EPA that lays out the proposed program.25 
The proposed program must meet the mens rea requirements along with 
eight additional listed criteria in CWA § 402(b)(1)-(9)26 and 40 C.F.R. § 
123.27.27 The EPA has a non-discretionary duty to authorize that state to 
run its own NPDES program if all criteria are met.28 The nine criteria are 
meant to ensure state NPDES programs are adequate and will not 
undermine water quality preservation and enforcement capabilities.29 
In 1987, Congress strengthened the CWA by permitting 
misdemeanor criminal prosecutions for a defendant who “negligently” 
violates the statute and felony prosecutions for “knowingly” violating the 
statute.30 This was a change from the unified and weaker “willfully or 
 
18 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402 (this section includes industrial wastewater, 
municipal wastewater, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), among 
others).  
19 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(b)-(c). 
20 See id. § 402(b). 
21 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2). 
22 See id.  
23 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1). 
24 See Mens Rea, supra note 14. 
25 See 40 CFR § 123.21(a). 
26 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)-(9). 
27 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2). 
28 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b). 
29 See RANDOLPH L. HILL, THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 74 (Mark A. Ryan, ed. 4th 
ed. 2018). 
30 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1)-(2) ((1) “Negligent Violations: 1 year 
and/or $2,500 - 25,000 per day; Subsequent convictions 2 years and/or $50,000 per day. 
(2) Knowing Violations: 3 years and/or $5,000 - 50,000 per day; Subsequent convictions 
6 years and/or $100,000 per day”). 
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negligently” criminal intent standard found in the original adoption of the 
CWA.31 Case law that followed the 1987 amendments upheld 
misdemeanor criminal penalties for “ordinary negligence,” not requiring 
heightened “criminal” or “gross negligence.”32 Since 1972, forty-seven 
states have been approved to take over NPDES authority from the EPA,33 
Idaho being the most recent.34 Of these forty-seven states, thirty-three 
require an intent standard for criminal enforcement that is stricter than 
the CWA allows.35 Further, fourteen states that criminalize ordinary 
negligence have not updated their programs to include the 1987 felony 
amendment.36 In order to comply with the language and intent of the 
CWA and its own regulations, while also ensuring sufficient deterrence, 
avoiding future litigation, and preventing withdrawal of dozens of 
authorized state NPDES programs, the EPA should promulgate new 
CWA regulations. 
These regulations should define “negligently,” outlined in the 
CWA’s criminal penalties section, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), as ordinary 
negligence, eliminate the note contained under 40 C.F.R. § 
123.27(a)(3)(ii)37 to bring the regulation into compliance with the 1987 
CWA amendments and prevent contradiction of the clear meaning of 40 
 
31 See Brief for Appellant, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 2, 2018). 
32 United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999). 
33 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) State Program Authority, 
ENV'T PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-
authority (reporting that the only states not approved are Massachusetts, New Hampshire 
and New Mexico). 
34 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 31. 
35 See e.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-22-14 (1975) (criminal penalties for willful or 
gross negligence); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-609 (2020) (criminal penalties for 
reckless, knowing, intentional, and criminal negligence violations); Connecticut, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 22a-438 (2013) (criminal penalties for criminal negligence and knowing 
violations); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 403.161 (2020) (criminal penalties for willfulness, 
reckless indifference, and gross careless disregard); and Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
38, § 349 (2019) (criminal penalties for intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with 
criminal negligence violations). 
36 See e.g., Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-263(B) (2018); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 
8-4-103 (1987); California, CAL. WATER CODE § 13387(b) (2011); Delaware, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, § 6013(a) (2008); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 342D-32(1) (2020); Iowa, 
IOWA CODE § 39-117(1) (2020); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2076.2A (2000); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 115.071(2)(a) (2011); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-632 
(2019); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f(3) (2016); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 27A, § 2-6-206(G)(1)(2020); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.32(b) (2013); West 
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 22-11-24(c) (2009); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 283.91(3). 
37 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“States which provide the criminal remedies based on 
‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict liability satisfy the requirement of 
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”). 
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C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2), and identify the states that have been authorized 
to run their own NPDES programs with illegal heightened mens rea 
standards for misdemeanor offenses. Further, the EPA should provide for 
a period of two years from the issuance of the final rule for those states 
to make the necessary legislative changes to their programs and re-
submit them to the EPA for re-approval. Finally, the new regulations 
should specify that if a state does not make the necessary changes in 
time, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to withdraw the prior 
approval of that state’s NPDES authorization and take back program 
authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). 
This Note will examine the CWA statutory and regulatory provisions 
that establish the NPDES permit program requirements that a state must 
meet in order to assume permitting and enforcement authority from the 
EPA, specifically regarding criminal intent standards. It will expose a 
multitude of issues arising from the failure of the EPA to update its 
regulations to match CWA statutory changes, the EPA’s illegal approval 
of multiple state NPDES permit programs, the consequences of these 
approvals on state NPDES enforcement, and the impending crisis of the 
NPDES program as a whole as it currently stands. 
 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The background sections that follow highlight the CWA, its purpose, 
its structure, and its objectives. It features an in-depth look at the relevant 
statutory provisions and accompanying EPA regulations that inform how 
the CWA is to be carried out and enforced. Finally, it examines the 
litigation arising from the EPA’s approval of Idaho’s NPDES permit 
program and how this might affect the NPDES program as a whole. 
 
A. The Failure of State Water Pollution Control 
 
By the mid-1960s, every state in the country had some type of public 
agency responsible for monitoring and minimizing pollution to protect 
water quality.38 Unfortunately, most state water pollution laws were 
generally weak, and tough enforcement was essentially non-existent 
against even the most blatant polluters.39 State agencies were reluctant to 
take enforcement actions against polluting industries and individuals in 
 
38 See N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the 
1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, 4 
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 81-82 (2013). 
39 See id. 
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their own states, instead pursuing a strategy of voluntary compliance and 
non-legal persuasion.40 
In 1971, the Senate Committee on Public Works concluded that "the 
national effort to abate and control water pollution has been inadequate 
in every vital aspect."41 The report focused mostly on the lack of 
enforcement, citing the fact that only one enforcement action under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act had been brought as of 1971.42 
 
B. The Federal Government Takes Action: The Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Clean Water Act 
 
On December 4, 1970, President Nixon created the EPA through 
executive order.43 One of the EPA’s first major responsibilities would be 
to clean up and protect the nation’s waters.44 Taking advantage of the 
broad public support and momentum around environmental issues, 
Congress decided to make sweeping amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act of 1948.45 These amendments became commonly 
known as the Clean Water Act.46 Section 101(a) of the CWA specifically 
states that the goal of the act is “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” and attain 
“water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, 
shellfish and wildlife and provides for recreation.”47  
The CWA gave the EPA broad jurisdiction to regulate discharges 
into “navigable waters.”48 Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the 
 
40 See N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the 
Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clear Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 643 
(1977) (outlining state sanitary engineer’s attitude towards water quality and 
enforcement: "Dilution is the solution to pollution."). 
41 S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3674.  
42 See id.   
43 H.R. DOC. NO. 91-366, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
RELATIVE TO REORGANIZATION PLANS NOS. 3 and 4 of 1970 (July 9, 1970). 
44 See id. 
45 See History of the Clean Water Act, EPA (2019), https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); see generally Hines, 
supra note 38. Congress overwhelmingly passed the amendments in the form of a bill on 
October 4, 1972. President Nixon delayed for as long as he could before formally vetoing 
it, citing too many federal dollars spent on the grant program. The next day, both 
chambers of Congress easily overrode the President's veto. The amendments became law 
on October 18, 1972. 
46 See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 45. 
47 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 101(a). 
48 Id. § 502(7) (defining navigable waters as “the waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas”); see generally Donna M. Downing, Scope of “The Waters of the 
United States” Protected by the Clean Water Act, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 
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“discharge of any pollutant” by any “person” from any “point source” 
into “navigable waters,” except as in compliance with sections 302, 306, 
307, 318, 402, and 404 of the Act.49 Section 402, NPDES, is the main 
program that issues allowances in the form of permits to point source 
discharges,50 and thus is at the heart of the Clean Water Act. 
 
C. The Structure of the Clean Water Act 
 
1. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
 
To achieve the goals set out in section 301, the CWA sets liquid 
waste (known as "effluent") limitations to constrain the amount of a 
pollutant that any point source can legally discharge.51 To properly and 
uniformly implement these effluent limitations, the CWA established the 
NPDES permit program.52 The NPDES program requires all point source 
discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States to obtain a 
section 402 permit before discharging.53 The program covers a broad and 
extensive list of point source dischargers.54 Overall, the NPDES program 
ensures compliance with the CWA and the EPA’s requirements that 
dischargers receive a permit.55 Individual NPDES permits include 
effluent limitations and monitoring and reporting requirements, among 
other standard conditions.56  
 
13 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 4th ed. 2018) (“Whether a particular body of water is 
jurisdictional as a ‘water of the United States’ is a key threshold question for determining 
whether a discharge is into a water will require a permit under the CWA.”). 
49 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 301(a); see also id. § 502(12) (defining 
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any 
point source, and any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the 
ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft."); id. § 502(14) (a 
“point source” refers to "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance...from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged"). 
50 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402. 
51 See id. § 301; Kyle W. Robisch, Getting to the (Non)Point: Private Governance as a 
Solution to Nonpoint Source Pollution, 67 VAND. L. REV. 539, 540, (2014). 
52 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402. 
53 See id.; Hines, supra note 38, at 81-82 (explaining that the NPDES permit program 
resembles the Refuse Act of 1899’s prohibition of all industrial discharges to navigable 
waters). 
54 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 411 (cement manufacturing), §406 (grain mills), §412 
(concentrated animal feeding operations). 
55 See Karen M. McGaffey et al., Water Pollution Control Under the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 42 (Mark A. Ryan 
ed., 4th ed. 2018). 
56 See id. at 42-43.  
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Technology-based effluent limitations are promulgated nationally by 
the EPA and place limitations on the discharge of different types of 
pollutants57 based solely on the availability and cost of pollution control 
measures rather than on the impact the pollutants will have on the 
receiving water.58 If the EPA has promulgated a guideline for an industry 
to which a discharging facility belongs, the NPDES permit for that 
discharger will incorporate those limits directly, with exceptions only in 
extremely limited and defined circumstances.59 In addition to the 
technology based standard, NPDES permit contains water-quality based 
effluent limitations in order to maintain compliance with water quality 
standards set by the EPA and the respective state where the facility is 
located.60 These limitations are based solely on the impact of the 
discharge on the receiving waters.61  
Monitoring and reporting requirements are another important part of 
a discharger’s NPDES permit. Permit holders are required to monitor 
their own discharges and report the results to the proper permitting 
authority in that state, either state or federal.62 These reports are called 
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs).63 DMRs are one of the most 
important tools used in enforcement actions against facilities that violate 
their permits, in addition to random, periodic inspections of facilities 
carried out by enforcement authorities.64  
Anyone who discharges or proposes to discharge pollutants from a 
point source to water of the United States must apply for and receive an 
NPDES permit. If the terms of a permit are not complied with, or an 
entity discharges pollutant without a proper permit, the CWA authorizes 
 
57 See id.  
58 See Industrial Effluent Guideline, EPA (Dec. 2019), https://www.epa.gov/eg/industrial-
effluent-guidelines; CWA §§ 301, 306. These provisions establish four different types of 
technology-based standards. They include: "best available technology economically 
achievable," "best practicable control technology currently available,” "best conventional 
pollutant control technology,” and "best available demonstrated control technology.” 
Each of these standards are based on the performance of other facilities in the industry, 
the type of pollutants discharged, and when the facility was constructed. They can be 
based on the average of the best performing facilities, the single best operating facility, or 
even the best demonstrated technology in a laboratory. A set of effluent guidelines for an 
industry can include many or all of the different technology-based guidelines mentioned. 
59 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 301(b), (n) (outlines the “fundamentally 
different factor” variance for technology-based effluent guidelines). 
60 McGaffey et al., supra note 55, at 51. 
61 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 302(a), 303(e)(3)(A). 
62 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1)(4). 
63 See id.  
64 See McGaffey et al., supra note 55, at 43. 
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civil and criminal enforcement.65 
 
2. Cooperative Federalism 
 
While the history of the failure of state authority over water quality 
was well-documented at the time of the CWA's passage, Congress 
nevertheless preserved a vital role for states in the CWA.66 Section 
402(b) of the CWA authorizes the EPA to delegate its inherent NPDES 
permitting authority to a state for facilities discharging to waters within 
that respective state.67 This delegation to states by the EPA is governed 
meticulously by CWA provisions and EPA regulations. When a state 
opts to seek NPDES permitting authority from the EPA, it must first 
prepare and submit a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to the EPA 
regional administrator.68 The proposed NPDES program “must contain 
adequate authority for the states to issue permits, ensure the public and 
any affected state receives notice for each application, provide an 
opportunity for public comment and hearing on permit decisions, abate 
permit violations, and provide for appropriate civil and criminal 
penalties.”69 The EPA cannot approve a state program if it does not meet 
the nine requirements set out in the statute,70 but has a non-discretionary 
duty to approve the program if it does.71 One of those nine criteria is 
“adequate authority” to “abate violations of the permit or permit 
program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and 
means of enforcement.”72  
Even after being granted the NPDES permitting authority, states are 
still subject to EPA oversight over most permitting decisions.73 In short, 
the CWA and EPA regulations set “a solid federal floor for state program 
integrity” before the EPA can relinquish its authority to issue permits and 
 
65 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309. 
66 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6; McGaffey et al., supra note 55, at 52. States are in charge of 
setting the water quality standards for waters within their borders. This includes 
designating use or uses for each body of water, the water quality criteria needed to protect 
those uses, and an anti-degradation policy.  
67 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b). 
68 See 40 C.F.R. §123.21(a)(4). 
69 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 123.25; HILL, supra 
note 29, at 75. 
70 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)-(9). 
71 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b) (EPA “shall approve” a state’s 
application “unless [EPA] determines that adequate authority does not exist”).  
72 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b)(7). 
73 See 33 U.S.C. §1342(b); HILL, supra note 29, at 77. This power allows EPA to “veto” a 
permit without stripping the state of its program entirely. 
12
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss2/3
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 
183 
enforce violations.74 As of the writing of this Note, forty-seven states 
have been authorized to administer their own NPDES program, the 
majority of which were approved within five years of 1972.75   
While it may seem that the ability to delegate is unnecessary, the 
burden of issuing NPDES permits is enormous and would be impractical 
for the EPA to take on alone. The EPA’s own data shows that there are 
currently more than 51,000 facilities in the United States with an active 
or pending state issued NPDES permit or permit application in forty-
seven states that have assumed their own permitting program from the 
EPA.76 That number is roughly fifty times the number of facilities with 
an EPA issued permit or pending permit.77 Since 2010, Congress has 
decreased the EPA’s budget by $1.4 billion dollars, down to $8.8 billion, 
and, since 1999, the number of EPA employees has declined by roughly 
twenty-three percent.78 By contrast, California’s most recent budget 
proposal included $11.3 billion for their state Natural Resource and 
Environmental Protection agencies79 and New York allocated $1.8 
billion for their Department of Environmental Conservation.80 With the 
lack of funding and staff at the federal level compared to many states, 
state control of local NPDES permitting and enforcement is essential. 
But, while state power over their own programs has increasingly become 
a necessity, the sufficiency and integrity of their programs have 
increasingly come into question—especially in regard to criminal 
enforcement. 
 
3. Clean Water Act Criminal Enforcement 
 
 
74 Hines, supra note 38, at 99. 
75 See NPDES State Program Information, EPA (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information. The “Authority” button on 
this EPA webpage shows the year in which each of the forty-seven states was authorized 
to administer the CWA. 
76 ECHO, EPA, https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/facility-search/results. EPA’s Enforcement 
and Compliance History Online (ECHO) tool can be used to search for the total number 
NPDES permits issued in each state by all non-federal permitting authorities. These 
include states, municipalities, and tribal agencies. The total number is 51,011 facilities. 
77 See id. 
78 See EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget 
(last updated June 24, 2020). 
79 See Gabriel Petrek, The 2019-20 Budget: Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3933. 
80 See DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, NEW YORK STATE, 
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/agencies/appropData/Environmental
ConservationDepartmentof.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2019). 
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Throughout the 1980s, Congress became increasingly committed to 
stronger criminal enforcement for CWA violations.81 In 1982, the EPA 
hired its first criminal investigators "in recognition that criminal penalties 
had the potential for greater general deterrence than the more traditional 
civil or administrative remedies."82 That same year, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) established an Environmental Crimes Unit to deal with the 
increased prosecution load.83  
From the passage of the CWA in 1972 until 1987, the EPA was 
given the authority to bring only misdemeanor criminal charges against a 
defendant who “willfully or negligently” violated enumerated sections of 
the CWA, including the NPDES program.84 “Willfully or negligently” 
was a conjunctive standard, allowing for some discretion in levying 
criminal penalties against violators for differing levels of mens rea that 
fell between negligence and willfulness.85 In 1987, Congress amended 
the enforcement provisions of the statute in order to add a felony 
provision and provide for harsher criminal penalties,86 but the EPA failed 
to update the accompanying regulation to reflect those changes.87 The 
statutory amendments divided the CWA criminal provision § 309(c)(1) 
into two distinct subsections: a “negligent” misdemeanor,88 and a 
 
81 See Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the Heightened Criminal Liability Imposed on 
Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 377, 383 (1996). 
82  Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective View, 22 
ENVTL. L 1315 (1992). 
83 See Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environmental-
criminal-law (last updated May 13, 2015). 
84 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1) (1972) (“Any person who willfully 
or negligently violates section 801, 302, 306, 307, or 308 of this Act, or any permit 
condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under 
section 402 of this Act by the Administrator or by a State, shall be punished by a fine of 
not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for 
not more than one year, or by both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a 
first conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not 
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, 
or by both.”).  
85 See Wettach, supra note 81, at 382. 
86 See id. at 381. 
87 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“Criminal fines shall be recoverable against any 
person who willfully or negligently violates any applicable standards or limitations; any 
NPDES permit condition; or any NPDES filing requirement. These fines shall be 
assessable in at least the amount of $10,000 a day for each violation. Note: States which 
provide the criminal remedies based on ‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict 
liability satisfy the requirement of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”).  
88 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1) (“Any person who--(A) negligently 
violates…any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a 
permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or by a State…shall be 
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“knowing” felony.89 In effect, the amended § 309(c)(1) and new § 
309(c)(2) give the EPA the authority to bring misdemeanor criminal 
charges if they can establish that the defendant acted negligently, and 
felony charges if a defendant acted knowingly.90 The amendments raised 
the penalties for violations significantly,91 and only a few years after the 
amendments went into effect, between 1992 and 1993, the number of 
federal environmental criminal cases doubled.92 While the statutory 
meaning of the “knowingly” standard has been the subject of some 
dispute, litigation over the federal “negligently” standard, and 
specifically what level of negligence states must adopt when they are 
authorized to administer their own NPDES programs, has raised serious 
questions about criminal enforcement of the CWA. This has put the 
entire NPDES program at risk. 
 
D. Ordinary vs. Criminal Negligence 
 
While § 309(c)(1) of the CWA does not specifically define the word 
“negligently,” either in its original form or after the 1987 amendments,93 
there is definitive and mounting case law that speaks to what type of 
negligence applies. As of the writing of this Note, three United States 
 
punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or 
by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a 
violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, 
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by 
imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.”). 
89 Id. § 309(c)(2) (“Any person who--(A) knowingly violates…any permit condition or 
limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this 
title by the Administrator or by a State…shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
$5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 
3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first 
conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more 
than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by 
both.”). 
90 See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1)-(2). 
91 See James D. Oesterle, Enforcement: Sections 309 and 505, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
HANDBOOK 310 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 4th ed. 2018); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 
309(c)(2) (Those who “knowingly” discharge a pollutant from a point source into a water 
of the United States without an NPDES Permit or in violation of a permit “shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or 
by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a 
violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, 
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $100,000 per day of violation, or by 
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by both.”). 
92 See Wettach, supra note 81, at 383. 
93 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1). 
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Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the common law “ordinary” or 
“simple” negligence standard applies to § 309(c)(1) and not a heightened 
“gross” or “criminal” negligence standard.94 While the debate about 
which form of negligence is required by § 309(c)(1) continues in 
academic circles,95 neither the courts nor the EPA have shown any 
appetite for reconsidering their interpretations of the standard. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines negligence as “[t]he failure to 
exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would 
have exercised in a similar situation.96 Gross negligence is defined as 
“[a] lack of even slight diligence or care…[a] conscious, voluntary act or 
omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to 
another party, who may typically recover exemplary damages.”97 The 
difference between the lower ordinary negligence standard and the 
higher criminal negligence standard can be significant and lies "in their 
descriptions of the relevant unobserved risk."98  
This distinction between levels of negligence is critically important 
because when a state assumes NPDES authority, they are also assuming 
the criminal enforcement authority from the EPA. The EPA’s regulations 
plainly require that state criminal intent standards be “no greater” than 
federal standards.99 Because the EPA and the courts have established that 
§309(c)(1) refers to “ordinary” negligence and not some heightened 
“gross” or “criminal” negligence,100 it follows that state criminal intent 
standards can be no higher than “ordinary” negligence. While the 
regulations are clear, thirty-three states have NPDES programs with 
 
94 See e.g., United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120-22 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1102, 1121 (2000) (explaining that if Congress intended to prescribe a 
heightened negligence standard, it could have done so explicitly as it did elsewhere in the 
statute); United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1279 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating “the Clean 
Water Act...criminalizes any act of ordinary negligence that leads to the discharge of a 
pollutant into the navigable waters of the United States.”); United States v. Pruett, 681 
F.3d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 2012) (“This subsection [CWA § 309(c)(1)(a)] imposes an 
ordinary negligence standard.”). 
95 See David E. Roth, Stephen R. Spivack, Joseph G. Block, The Criminalization of 
Negligence Under the Clean Water Act, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 4, 9 (advocating for 
either Congress or the Supreme Court to intervene and make clear that mere civil 
negligence should not be punished as criminal conduct under the CWA). 
96 Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
97 Gross Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
98 See Common Issues, 2 STATE ENVTL. L. § 16:56 (2019); State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 
875, 885 (Alaska 1997). 
99 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (“The burden of proof and degree of knowledge or intent 
required under State law for establishing violations under paragraph (a)(3) of this section 
shall be no greater than the burden of proof or degree of knowledge or intent EPA must 
provide when it brings an action under the appropriate Act.”). 
100 Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1120-22. 
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heightened intent standards, in clear violation of the CWA and the EPA’s 
regulations.101 This issue was recently in front of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, stemming from a challenge to the EPA’s 2018 approval of 
Idaho’s NPDES program application.102 
 
E. Idaho Conservation League v. EPA: Challenging Idaho’s 
NPDES Program and the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion 
 
In 2018, Idaho became the forty-seventh, and latest, state to have its 
own NPDES program authorized by the EPA – the Idaho Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (IPDES). The IDPES criminal penalty 
provision does directly cover “negligent” misdemeanors,103 but the 
state’s criminal code states that “[i]n every crime or public offense there 
must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal 
negligence.”104 In other words, Idaho’s IDPES enforcement law requires 
a heightened or “gross” negligence standard for criminal prosecutions. 
Neither Idaho nor the EPA disputed that contention.105 While the EPA 
and Idaho were both in support of the IPDES program authorization, this 
was not always the case. 
Idaho first applied for authorization in August of 2016 but was 
denied for the exact reason stated above. In a response letter to the Idaho 
Department of Environmental Quality, the EPA stated: 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) criminal intent standard 
for negligence is simple negligence. As described in the 
submitted Attorney General’s Statement, the State of 
Idaho’s criminal intent standard for negligent violations 
is gross negligence. 40 CFR 123.27(b)(2) requires states 
 
101 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-22-14 (1975) (criminal penalties for willful or gross 
negligence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-609 (2017) (criminal penalties for reckless, 
knowing, intentional, and criminal negligence violations); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-438 
(2013) (criminal penalties for criminal negligence and knowing violations); FLA. STAT. § 
403.161 (2019) (criminal penalties for willfulness, reckless indifference, and gross 
careless disregard); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 349 (2019) (criminal penalties for 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence violations); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 750-2.4(b) (2019) (criminal penalties for criminal negligence). 
102 See generally Brief for Appellant, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 
(9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018). 
103See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-117 (2020) (“Any person who willfully or negligently 
violates any Idaho national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) standard or 
limitation, permit condition or filing requirement shall be guilty of a misdemeanor…”). 
104 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-114 (2020) (emphasis added). 
105 See Response Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-
72684 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018). 
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to have criminal intent standards that may not be greater 
than the standards which apply to the EPA. Since the 
CWA and federal courts have defined the CWA’s 
negligence standard as ordinary or simply negligence, an 
approvable State NPDES program must have a criminal 
negligence standard that does not require a greater 
burden of proof than this intent standard. A gross 
negligence standard does not meet this requirement. As 
such, Idaho will need to adequately address this criminal 
negligence standard issue in order for EPA to approve 
the IPDES program.106 
 
In the letter, the EPA correctly identified that Idaho’s proposed 
criminal intent standard, gross negligence, was greater than the CWA’s 
ordinary negligence standard in section 309(c)(1), and thus not in 
compliance with 40 CFR 123.27(b)(2).107 The EPA clearly 
communicated to Idaho that until this situation was addressed, it could 
not approve the IDPES program.108 On June 5, 2018, the EPA, under a 
new presidential administration and EPA Administrator, approved the 
IPDES program despite Idaho’s refusal to make any changes to its 
“gross” negligence standard.109 Idaho Conservation League (ICL) 
brought suit against the EPA for their approval of the IPDES program, 
citing the exact criminal mens rea issue outlined by the EPA itself.110  
In response, the brief filed by the EPA in Idaho Conservation 
League v. EPA (ICL v. EPA) put forth a two-part main argument to 
counter the claim that the IPDES program contains insufficient criminal 
enforcement authority. First, the EPA argued that the note contained in 
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii), that says “[s]tates which provide the 
criminal remedies based on ‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or 
strict liability satisfy the requirement of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this 
section”, would “control the more general language in 40 C.F.R. § 
123.27(b)(2).”111 Second, the EPA argued that the “cross-referenced 
 
106 See Letter from Dennis J. McLearran, Regional Administrator, EPA, to John Trippets, 
Director, IDAHO DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY (Sept. 30, 2016),  
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ipdes-correspondence-
completeness-finding-09302016.pdf. 
107 See id.  
108 See id. 
109 Brief for Appellant at 38, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 2, 2018). 
110 See id. at 1. 
111 See Response Brief for Appellee at 16, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-
72684 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018); 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (“The burden of proof and degree 
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language in the two regulatory provisions, 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3) and 
(b)(2), creates ambiguity” and that the agency’s interpretation of a 
regulation that “points in more than one direction” is entitled to 
deference under Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414-2418 (2019), 
Supreme Court precedent reinforcing that courts should defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations if they are genuinely 
ambiguous.112  
ICL asked the court to remand the case without vacatur of the entire 
IPDES program.113 As mentioned previously, the importance of state 
delegated NPDES programs is undeniable, and ICL’s remedy sought 
would preserve the IPDES program as a whole, but require Idaho to fix 
the criminal intent standards in the program and then re-submit for 
approval within two years.114 Idaho would have to pass amendments to 





On September 10, 2020, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
dismissed both of the EPA’s arguments, holding that the Idaho state plan 
must employ a standard “’no greater than’ simple negligence.”116 
According to the court, the EPA’s assertion that the agency may approve 
states’ NPDES program applications that employ “gross” or “criminal” 
negligence mens rea standards stands against both the plain reading of its 
 
of knowledge or intent required under State law for establishing violations under 
paragraph (a)(3) of this section, shall be no greater than the burden of proof or degree of 
knowledge or intent EPA must provide when it brings an action under the appropriate 
Act.”). 
112 See Response Brief for Appellee at 30, 34-35, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 
18-72684 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414-2418 
(2019)) (“To garner deference, the agency’s interpretation must be: (1) “reasonable” and 
of “the character and context” to support deference based on whether the interpretation is 
the agency’s official position; (2) within the agency’s substantive expertise; and (3) 
reflective of the agency’s “fair and considered judgement” while taking into account 
reliance interests and avoiding “unfair surprise to the regulated parties.” If an agency’s 
interpretation is entitled to deference, then the applied deference “gives an agency 
significant leeway to say what its own rules mean.”). 
113 See Brief for Appellant at 38, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 (9th 
Cir. Oct. 2, 2018). 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684, 2020 WL 5422448, at *1 (9th 
Cir. Sept. 10, 2020) (“Under § 123.27(b)(2), a state plan must employ a standard “no 
greater than” simple negligence, such as strict liability or simple negligence.”). 
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own regulations and the wording of the statute itself.117 As a remedy, the 
court granted ICL’s request, and remanded without vacatur for the EPA 
to promptly address the deficiency with respect to the mens rea 
standard.118  
While the opinion is unpublished, and intended only for precedent in 
the Ninth Circuit, the opinion is the first and only time a United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on the state mens rea issue. Future 
appellants will undoubtedly rely on and cite to ICL v. EPA and other 
jurisdictions will undoubtedly seek guidance from the opinion. The 
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling beyond Idaho are substantial 
and raise a host of unanswered questions and problems for the EPA. 
Could other state NPDES programs be subject to litigation by citizens 
groups similar to ICL if they have similar issues with the criminal intent 
standards? What statutory power or obligations does the EPA have to 
remedy these programs, and how should they go about exercising that 
power? What is the best solution in order to preserve the integrity of the 
NPDES program? These are all questions that need to be answered in 
light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
 
A. Federal Legal Requirements for Corrective Action 
 
In 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3), the CWA provides that, where the EPA 
determines that a state is not administering its program in a manner that 
conforms to the Act, the EPA must inform the state, request corrective 
action, and proceed with withdrawing approval of the state program if 
corrective action is not taken within ninety days of the EPA’s request.119 
“Whenever the Administrator determines . . . that a State is not 
administering a program . . . in accordance with requirements of this 
section, [they] shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective 
action is not taken . . . the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such 
program.”120 There is case law to suggest that § 1342(c)(3) places a non-
discretionary duty upon the Administrator of the EPA to withdraw a state 
program that does not take the corrective action required.121 When the 
EPA learns that state practices do not conform to federal law, it has an 
 
117 See id. 
118 See id.  
119 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). 
120 Id. (emphasis added). 
121 See generally, Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric., 809 F.3d 868, 870 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(“[W]hen a state fails to administer properly a state-NPDES program, the CWA requires 
the EPA to withdraw approval of the state-NPDES program after a hearing, notice, and 
time to cure…”). 
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obligation to make findings and demand corrective action.122 Courts have 
also found that the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to act, enforceable 
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2), the CWA’s citizen suit provision.123 In 
order to alert the Administrator to deficiencies in a state program, 




A. How the EPA Should Address Inadequate State NPDES 
Programs 
 
Now that the Ninth Circuit has ruled on the Idaho Program, the EPA 
has a non-discretionary duty to demand that the thirty-three states with 
inadequate programs take corrective action to address their mens rea 
standards.125 The EPA will most likely receive withdrawal petitions from 
citizens’ groups, identifying the mens rea issue in their respective states, 
and demanding that the EPA remedy the program in cooperation with the 
state, or terminate the program. In reality though, with the EPA’s relative 
lack of resources, the prospect of the termination of dozens of states’ 
authorizations and the subsequent assumption by the EPA would create 
serious problems for the efficacy and efficiency of the NPDES program. 
Further, withdrawal petitions filed as far back as 1997 are still officially 
pending with the EPA, showing that the withdrawal process is painfully 
slow and mostly ineffective at addressing major issues with state 
plans.126 Because both the EPA and states know that the agency does not 
have the practical ability to take back state NPDES programs, the EPA 
has very little motivation or leverage to engage meaningfully with states. 
While voluntary state action is extraordinarily unlikely, especially in 
states that do not prioritize environmental protection, the new political 
climate in Washington provides a rare opportunity for EPA to take action 
on this issue. Under the out-going Trump Administration, the EPA 
approved Idaho’s inadequate program after previously denying the same 
program during the Obama Administration. But, with a new 
Administration and a Congress more inclined to put pressure on the EPA 
 
122 Save the Valley, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 (S.D. Ind. 
2000). 
123 Save the Valley, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Save the Valley II), 223 F. Supp. 2d 
997, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 2002). 
124 NPDES State Program Withdrawal Petitions, EPA (Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-withdrawal-petitions. 
125 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). 
126 NPDES State Program Withdrawal Petitions, EPA (Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-withdrawal-petitions. 
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to protect the environment and restore a functioning Clean Water Act, 
the actions suggested below can and should be pursued immediately. 
In order to remedy the state program situation without endangering 
the NPDES program and water quality, the EPA should promulgate new 
CWA regulations. These regulations should first, define “negligently,” 
outlined in the CWA’s criminal penalties section 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), 
as ordinary negligence in order to prevent any further litigation under the 
NPDES program or other CWA permitting programs, such as section 
404 discharge of dredged or fill material. The regulations will also serve 
to reduce confusion among states and regulated entities. Additionally, the 
EPA should eliminate the outdated note contained under 40 C.F.R. § 
123.27(a)(3)(ii)127 bringing the regulation into compliance with the 1987 
CWA amendments and preventing the contradiction of the clear meaning 
of 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2). Further, the EPA should identify the states 
that have been authorized to run their own NPDES programs with illegal 
heightened mens rea standards for misdemeanor offenses, and provide 
for a period of two years from the issuance of the final rule for those 
states to make the necessary legislative changes to their programs and re-
submit them to the EPA for re-approval. Finally, the new regulations 
should specify that if a state does not make the necessary changes in 
time, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to withdraw the prior 
approval of that state’s NPDES authorization and take back program 
authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). 
 
1. The EPA’s non-discretionary duties under 33 U.S.C. § 
1342(c)(3) 
 
The proper outcome of ICL v. EPA will force the EPA to identify 
and provide notice to the thirty-three states with non-compliant NPDES 
programs under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). If the EPA fails to perform the 
non-discretionary duties outlined in § 1342(c)(3), the agency will avail 
itself to suits filed pursuant to the CWA’s citizen suit provision, 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(2), which states that “any citizen may commence a 
civil action on his own behalf—(2) against the Administrator where there 
is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under 
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”128 The 
only way to avoid these inevitable citizen suits from arising across the 
country, is to send notice to all states that have NPDES programs not in 
 
127 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“States which provide the criminal remedies based on 
‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict liability satisfy the requirement of 
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”). 
128 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).  
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compliance with CWA § 309(c)(1)’s ordinary negligence requirement,129 
and demand corrective action. The most efficient way to accomplish this 
is by adopting new and revised CWA regulations. 
  
2. Adopting new CWA regulations 
 
The EPA should first, define “negligently,” in the CWA’s criminal 
penalties section CWA § 309(c)(1),130 as ordinary negligence in order to 
prevent any further litigation and reduce confusion among states and 
regulated entities. Second, the EPA should eliminate the note contained 
under 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii),131 remove the outdated “willfully or 
negligently” language in (a)(3)(ii),132 and replace it with the current 
CWA disjunctive “negligently”133 or “knowingly”134 mens rea standards. 
These changes would bring the regulation into compliance with the 1987 
CWA amendments, and prevent the contradiction of the clear meaning of 
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2), which prevents the states from having stricter 
mens rea standards than the EPA.135 Further, the EPA will prevent 
litigation in likely all thirty-three of the non-compliant states, and future 
litigation over approval of states’ section 404 state programs.136 
Additionally, while § 1342 (c)(3) serves as a mandate on the EPA to take 
back programs if the changes have not been made in ninety days,137 
states will need more than roughly three months to make the legislative 
changes required to keep their programs. Giving states two years to 
amend their programs will allow for state legislatures to make the 
necessary statutory changes. The threat of losing permitting authority 
over their own industries to the federal government should incentivize 
many states to take the corrective action needed quickly. Finally, the new 
regulations should specify that if a state does not make the necessary 
changes in time, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to withdraw the 
prior approval of that state’s NPDES authorization and take back 
program authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). This addition should 
ensure that states comply with the new regulations or face removal of 
 
129 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1). 
130 Id. 
131 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“States which provide the criminal remedies based on 
‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict liability satisfy the requirement of 
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”). 
132 Id.  
133 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.§ 309(c)(1).  
134 Id. § 309(c)(2). 
135 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2). 
136 Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684, 36 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018). 
137 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). 
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When it comes to protecting the safety and quality of water, the 
United States has an undoubtedly long and complex history. From the 
turn of the twentieth century all the way until 1972, the United States’ 
water pollution control policies focused on giving states broad and 
supreme power to both set water quality standards and enforce violations 
as they saw fit. The results of those policies were devastating and led to 
the passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, giving the federal 
government the chief authority to set water quality standards and enforce 
violations, with the ability to delegate some of this power to states. This 
balance of power between the EPA and the states is vital to the success 
of the CWA and specifically the NPDES program. Almost fifty years 
after passage of the CWA, states and the EPA have strayed dangerously 
far from its statutory requirements. 
With thirty-three states demanding a heightened negligence standard 
in order to bring misdemeanor charges for violations of their NPDES 
programs, and a recent Ninth Circuit ruling that unequivocally calls for 
state programs to employ ordinary negligence mens rea, the NPDES 
program as currently instituted is in jeopardy of failing. In order to 
preserve the program, increase its efficacy, and comply with statutory 
requirements, the EPA should promulgate new CWA regulations, 
remove the outdated note in 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii), notify the states 
that’s are not in compliance, and prepare to remove state authorizations if 
necessary. 
Overall, the fate of the NPDES program is in doubt. But, with a few 
pointed regulatory changes, the EPA can prevent further litigation, 
comply with its non-discretionary duties laid out in the CWA, and ensure 
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